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Abstract
We analyze the eectiveness of environmental policy when consumers are subject to social
inuence. To this end, we build a model of consumption decisions driven by socially-
embedded preferences formed under the inuence of peers in a social network. This
setting gives rise to a social multiplier of environmental policy. In an application to
climate change, we derive Pigouvian and target-achieving carbon taxes under socially-
embedded preferences. Under realistic assumptions the social multiplier is equal to 1.30,
allowing to reduce the eective tax by 38%. We show that the multiplier depends on
four factors: strength of social inuence, initial taste distribution, network topology and
income distribution. The approach provides a basis for rigorously analyzing a transition
to low-carbon lifestyles and identifying complementary information and network policies
to maximize the eectiveness of carbon taxation.
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1. Introduction
Social psychology has long established the sensitivity of individual decision-making to
peer inuence (Festinger, 1954; Deutsch and Gerard, 1955; Nolan et al., 2008; Schultz
et al., 2018). Research in behavioral economics arms that choices cannot be fully
explained by stable preferences and behavioral biases but that the social environment
aects agents' decisions (Bowles, 1998; Postlewaite, 1998; Mailath and Postlewaite, 2010;
Fehr and Ho, 2011; Ho and Stiglitz, 2016; Astier, 2018; Fatas et al., 2018). In addition,
neuroeconomic studies support the role of social context in the formation of preferences
(Fehr and Camerer, 2007; Mason et al., 2009; Engelmann and Hein, 2013).
In view of this, we develop a framework for the study of environmental and climate
policies which explicitly recognizes that consumers' preferences are shaped by interactions
with social peers. This can contribute to better design of policies aimed at promoting
or discouraging the consumption of goods or services whose utility depends on social
interactions. For example, price instruments can achieve a desired long-term outcome
by shifting a social norm towards the consumption of goods that are less damaging to
the environment (Nyborg et al., 2006, 2016; Dasgupta et al., 2016). In this study, we
focus on carbon taxation as a key policy aimed at reducing global greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions.
Carbon taxation, and more generally carbon pricing, increases the relative prices of
goods and services with a carbon-intensive production cycle, thus encouraging a reduction
in their consumption and a shift to low-carbon alternatives (Baranzini et al., 2017b;
Cramton et al., 2017; Stiglitz et al., 2017). Existing economic studies analyze carbon
pricing under the assumption that agents have xed preferences and do not interact with
others (e.g. Belori, 2017; Goulder et al., 2018; Hart, 2019). The purpose of our study
is to examine carbon taxation when preferences are subject to social inuence.
That visible behavior aects peers has been conrmed for various types of consump-
tion decisions with considerable mitigation potential (Wynes and Nicholas, 2017), such
as energy consumption (Allcott, 2011; Ferraro et al., 2011; Allcott and Rogers, 2014),
adoption of renewable energy technologies (Ozaki, 2011; Bollinger and Gillingham, 2012;
Inhoen et al., 2019), and choice of transportation mode (Bamberg et al., 2007; Grinblatt
et al., 2008; Abou-Zeid et al., 2013; Pike and Lubell, 2018). For instance, Allcott (2011)
show that agents decrease their consumption of energy when they receive information
about the consumption of similar neighbors. Studies by Bollinger and Gillingham (2012),
Baranzini et al. (2017a) and Baranzini et al. (2018) nd that agents are more likely to
adopt solar panels if neighbors have already done so. Such local diusion is driven by
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imitation of conspicuous consumption and communication of positive information about
solar panels among neighbors.
Few studies have addressed carbon taxation with changing or even endogeneous pref-
erences. Mattauch et al. (2018) analyze non-social endogenous preferences and climate
policies. They consider the case of a carbon tax directly aecting the preferences of
agents, through crowding-in or -out of intrinsic preferences by the monetary incentives
(Bowles and Hwang, 2008). A study by van den Bijgaart (2018) nds that endogenous
habit formation causes persistence in consumption choices. She shows that, as a result,
the optimal externality tax should initially be higher than the standard Pigouvian one
and gradually decrease over time. Finally, Ulph and Ulph (2018) study the role of con-
formity in consumption decisions under Pigouvian taxation. They nd that the existence
of a consumption norm weakens the eectiveness of the tax unless it succeeds to change
the norm. As an addition to this literature, we model the inuence of carbon taxation
on preferences explicitly through social network eects, which comes down to combining
public economics with social network theory.
Our results show that a carbon tax induces two types of eects. A rst-order or im-
mediate eect is a reduction in carbon-intensive consumption by an agent through the
usual price eect. A second-order or subsequent eect is a change in preferences due
to changes in consumption in the social network, leading to further changes in the con-
sumption choices of agents through socially-embedded preferences. We explore dierent
hypotheses concerning the mechanism of imitation between agents, i.e. perfect and im-
perfect imitation. We show that the endogenous formation of preferences in a social
network can lead to the emergence of a 'social multiplier' of carbon taxation (Glaeser
et al., 2003). As a result, due to imitation between agents, the tax elasticity of carbon-
intensive consumption is higher than the instantaneous price elasticity. It is worth noting
that in our model agents evolve towards a stronger taste for low-carbon goods because of
an imitation mechanism and not as a result of increased altruism or concern for climate
change.
We derive the Pigouvian and target-achieving taxes under socially-embedded prefer-
ences. The target-achieving approach determines the lowest carbon tax sucient to meet
a given GHG emissions reduction target, which does not necessarily emerge from a wel-
fare maximization exercise. This approach resembles the Intended Nationally Determined
Contributions within the 2015 Paris Agreement. We demonstrate that through network
eects a policy objective can be reached with a lower tax. In other words, considering
the social context in which preferences are formed allows reducing the eective carbon
tax rate, which in turn can raise public and political support for it. We further quantify
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the social multiplier of carbon taxation by simulating the outcomes of a tax in a large
network. Under realistic assumptions, social interactions multiply the eect of the tax
by 1.3 which allows to reduce the eective tax by 38%. In addition, the social-network
simulations makes possible an analysis of how core social characteristics, such as the
strength of social inuence in the formation of preferences, the distribution of tastes, the
topology of the social network, and the distribution of income inuence the eectiveness
of a carbon tax. A precise description of the context in which social interactions hap-
pen, through network modelling, can deal with relevant contextual factors that aect
the social multiplier and are bound to dier between regions and countries (Andor et al.,
2020).
Our ndings indicate that a population with high polarization of tastes experiences a
lower social multiplier of taxation. The reason is that agents with a strong taste for either
high- or low- carbon goods are less sensitive to social inuence, leading to a lower tax
eect on consumption. Such polarization is more likely to happen when social inuence
plays a strong role in the formation of preferences. We further show that increasing the
strength of social inuence does not always raise the social multiplier. Finally, income
distribution and network topology have a small impact on tax eectiveness when social
inuence is weak. However, when social interactions play a strong role in consumption
decisions, asymmetry in degree distribution of the social network and income inequality
can produce polarization by creating clusters of agents with similar tastes that weaken
the eectiveness of carbon taxation.
Our results mean that if consumption decisions depend on social interactions, the
design of environmental and climate policies should account for these. Moreover, the
contextual social factors allow for dening additional instruments, such as information
and network policies, which can reinforce the social multiplier and hence the eectiveness
of the basic regulatory policy.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model
of carbon taxation and socially-embedded preferences in the context of high- and low-
carbon consumption. Section 3 derives the social multiplier of the carbon tax and the
optimality conditions for Pigouvian and target-achieving taxation approaches. Section
4 presents numerical simulations to analyze the sensitivity of the social multiplier to
the strength of social inuence, initial taste distribution, network topology, and income
distribution. Section 5 concludes, discusses policy implications and suggests questions
for further research.
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2. Modelling consumption choices of socially-embedded agents
We consider a population of agents interacting in a xed social network N . They
consume two types of conspicuous goods, namely a low- and a high-carbon one. Li
and Hi denote the quantities of low- and high-carbon goods, respectively, which agent
i consumes. The choice by an agent is inuenced by intrinsic taste for high- and low-
carbon goods as well as by the choices of peers in her ego-network, Ni, i.e. the subset
of peers agent i is connected to. We conduct our analysis in partial equilibrium to limit
model complexity, allowing us to focus on agents that are primarily aected by social
interactions, namely the consumers.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the low-carbon good has a zero carbon
intensity and that a unit of consumption of the high-carbon good generates one unit of





, that agents by denition do not consider in their consumption
decision. A carbon tax τ is levied to correct for the externality. The tax revenue is
distributed among the agents as a lump-sum transfer. Agents maximize their utility,
subject to a budget constraint:
maxHi,Li Ui(αi, Hi, Li) (1)






















Here, αi ∈ [0, 1] represents the taste of agent i for high-carbon consumption goods,1 σ
the elasticity of substitution between the two goods, wi the income, and PL and PH the
prices of the goods. We denote with PH(τ) the price after tax (i.e. PH(τ) ≡ PH + τ)
and set PL as the numeraire (i.e. PL = 1). We primarily consider the case of high-
and low-carbon goods being substitutes (σ > 1). This assumption captures the common
case of a low-carbon option competing in consumption with a high-carbon one (e.g.,
transportation mode choice (Salvucci et al., 2019)).2.
1The marginal utility of good H increases with αi. Thus, a change in taste modies the structure of
preferences. In the rest of the paper, we refer to changes in taste as changes in the preference ordering.
2Macro studies indicate that at a larger scale high- and low- carbon goods may be complementary
due to the relative inelasticity of the power generating sector (Ma et al., 2008; Li and Lin, 2016; Kim,
2019; Mair et al., 2020). In view of this, we also present numerical results for σ < 1 in the Appendix C.
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We consider two components of taste: intrinsic πi ∈ [0, 1] and social Si. The intrinsic
component of taste is xed while the social one is subject to change. The latter is
endogenously determined by the observed consumption within an agent's ego-networkNi,
i.e. the subset of peers agent i is connected to.3 If the consumption of high-carbon goods
in one's network decreases (increases) then the socially-embedded taste also decreases
(increases). This is formalized as follows:
αi ≡ α(πi, Si) = (1− γ)πi + γSi (2)







Here γ ∈ [0, 1] denotes the strength of social inuence in the formation of preferences.
Note that if γ = 0 then the agents exhibit standard xed preferences. The taste can
change as a direct reaction to the tax, an eect known as crowding-in or -out of prefer-
ences, something addressed in other studies but beyond our approach here (Bowles and
Polania-Reyes, 2012).
With socially-embedded preferences, the utility of agent i is a function of her consump-
tion, her intrinsic taste, the relative price of the high-carbon good, and the consumption
decisions and income of her social peers. More specically, the consumption decisions
of peers are strategic complements: an agent experiences a higher marginal utility of
consuming a good as its popularity among her peers increases (Young, 1996).
In this system of social interactions, the equilibrium is dened as a vector of high-
carbon consumption where no agent can be better o by deviating. The action space
{H}, i.e. the set of possible consumption choices, is compact and convex, and the utility
function is concave and continuous in the agent's own choice and the choice of her peers.
The Marshallian demand of agent i that solves the optimization problem dened in Eq.(1)
is conditional on the consumption of agents j ∈ Ni, captured by the endogenous taste
αi, is:







1−σ + (1− αi)σ
. (4)
This demand function is equivalent to the best response given the consumption of peers,
hence BR stands for best response. Assuming that the budget constraint is binding,
the consumption of the other good is xed and we denote the utility of agent i with
Ui(Hi, αi, PH(τ), wi). The vector H
? is the equilibrium vector of high-carbon consump-
tion if each agent is best-responding to the other agents best-response; that is:
3i is not an element of Ni.
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H?i = argmaxHiUi(Hi, αi, PH(τ), wi) ∀i ∈ N
= argmaxHiUi(Hi, {H
?
j , wj}j∈Ni , πi, PH(τ), wi) ∀i ∈ N. (5)
Note that the taste vector α is not an argument of the equilibrium consumption function,
as consumption and tastes are jointly determined in equilibrium. Agents update their
taste αi({Hj , wj}j∈Ni , PH(τ), πi) based on the consumption decisions they observe in
their ego-network. We denote with α?i the taste of agent i in equilibrium:
α?i ≡ α({H?j , wj}j∈Ni , PH(τ), πi). (6)





i , PH(τ), wi) ∀i ∈ N. (7)
As our system only exhibits local interactions,4 the existence of the equilibrium fol-
lows from the concavity of the utility function via a xed-point argument (Horst and
Scheinkman, 2006; Ballester et al., 2006). It is widely recognized that social interactions
can give rise to multiple equilibria. Glaeser and Scheinkman (2003) show that uniqueness
of equilibrium depends on the relative inuence of peers on an individual's decision. Our
system has a unique equilibrium if
∣∣∣∂2Ui∂H2i ∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣ ∂2Ui∂Hi∂Si ∣∣∣ ∀i, that is, if the marginal utility
of consuming high-carbon goods decreases faster in own consumption than it increases
in consumption of peers. This is equivalent to imposing a positive upper bound γc < 1
on the strength of social inuence γ. Intuitively, in the case of γ = 1 agents have no
intrinsic taste but only imitate others, giving rise to multiple unstable equilibria, such
as all agents consuming only either the high-carbon good or the low-carbon one. In the
case of γ = 0, there is one obvious equilibrium with the taste vector being the intrinsic
tastes of the agents. We show the value of this upper bound in Table 4 in Appendix B.
In the next section, we derive the eect of carbon taxation for γ < γc.
3. Carbon tax under socially-embedded preferences
To explain the role of socially-embedded preferences on a carbon tax, we rst describe
the reaction of agents' consumption and taste when a tax is introduced. Then, we derive
Pigouvian and target-achieving taxes under socially-embedded preferences.
4A network exhibits local interactions if the utility of an agent depends on the specic consumption
decision of peers in her ego-network. Alternatively, in a system with global interactions the utility of an
agent depends on the distribution of consumption in the whole population.
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3.1. The multiplier eect of carbon taxation
Under socially-embedded preferences, a marginal decrease in the consumption of the









> 0 ∀i, j ∈ N ×Ni. (8)
This, in turn, drives further down the high-carbon demand of agent i. Therefore, in
equilibrium, the total price eect on agent i's consumption is moderated by the social
interactions among all agents in the network. If the social interactions reinforce the tax
eect, we say that the tax has a positive social multiplier (Glaeser et al., 2003).
Proposition 1. Under socially-embedded preferences, the tax has a positive multiplier if











∀i ∈ N. (9)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Distinct assumptions about the inuence of peers' consumption on preferences lead
to dierent tax eects. We present results for two formulations of socially-embedded
preferences. The rst one reects that agents perfectly imitate their peers' tastes, taking
into account the observed consumption and prices of the goods, and the second that they
imperfectly imitate their peers, relying only on observed consumption.
3.1.1. Perfect taste imitation
Consumption depends on both taste and relative prices. Hence, agents can interpret
a change of consumption of their peers in two ways: (i) as a taste shock, meaning that a
change in observed consumption is due to a variation of taste, and (ii) as a price shock.
For example, consider the choice between an electric vehicle and a combustion-engine car.
With a carbon tax, electric vehicles are relatively cheaper and their share in total vehicles
purchased increases due to the price eect. If an agent knows the demand function of
its peers, she is able to infer that this variation is totally imputable to a change of price
and not to a change of taste.
SPi (xi, PH) ≡ D−1(xi, PH). (10)
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Here D(α, PH) ≡ H
BR(α,PH)
LBR(α,PH)
denotes the ratio of high- and low-carbon consumption for






this ratio in agent i's ego-network.
Using the Marshallian demands, one obtains:


























Proposition 2. Under perfect taste imitation, a tax has a positive multiplier if agents
underestimate the tax eect on their peer's consumption.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The interpretation of Proposition 2 is that as agents observe a stronger decrease in
consumption than expected based on the price eect, they attribute this to a change
in the taste of their peers. Therefore, their own taste for high-carbon goods decreases
by imitation, triggering a stronger eect of the carbon tax on their own consumption.
Corollary 1 below shows that the gap between expected and observed peers' response to a
tax depends on the shape of the demand functions. In particular, it formalizes for a CES
utility function that the social multiplier is positive for complementary goods (σ < 1) and
negative for substitute goods (σ > 1). It means that agents generally underestimate the
tax eect when goods are complements and overestimate it when they are substitutes.






∀α1 < α2 ∈ (0, 1)2. (12)
With our utility function, this condition becomes:
σ < 1 (13)
Proof. See Appendix A.
3.1.2. Imperfect taste imitation
Alternatively, one can assume that agents imitate the average consumption of their
peers, without taking into account the prices of the goods. This comes down to imperfect
taste imitation. In this case, the tax does not directly aect the taste for goods, i.e.
∂α
∂τ = 0. Using the same example as above, when an agent observes that the share of
electric vehicles increases, she interprets it as a new descriptive norm (Schultz et al.,
9
2018) and her taste for electric vehicle increases, regardless of any changes in vehicle
prices5. We believe that imperfect taste imitation is behaviorally more realistic as it
does not assume that agents are capable of undertaking the complex calculations that
involve prices and elasticity of substitution (as illustrated by Eq. 11 above), needed to
infer the tastes of their peers.6 To elaborate this case, we dene the social component as
follows:
SIi (xi, PH(τ)) =
∑
j∈Ni Hj∑
j∈Ni Hj + Lj
(14)




















Here Ω denotes the social multiplier of carbon taxation.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The social multiplier captures the impact in equilibrium of the social interactions
in each individual reaction to a marginal increase of the carbon tax. Proposition 3
formalizes that under imperfect taste imitation, the overall tax eect is always higher
than the direct price eect. Note that the social multiplier of the tax Ω in Eq. (15) is
linked to the network structure through the Bonacich centrality of its agents (Bonacich,
1987; Ballester et al., 2006).7 This means that a more centrally positioned agent will be
more sensitive to changes in consumption by other agents in the network, thus increasing
the indirect and overall eect of the tax.8
Eq.(17) provides an approximation of the total tax eect on high-carbon consumption
by an agent i when only interactions with peers and peers of peers are taken into account
5Under imperfect taste imitation, if all peers have the same intrinsic taste, they will have the same
equilibrium taste, which may dier from their intrinsic taste. This means that even if all agents have
identical intrinsic tastes, social interactions can still cause a change in these.
6Moreover, one can argue that individual agents do not possess information about the elasticity of
substitution of their peers.
7According to Bonacich, an agent is more central if connected to peers having high centrality. In
our case, a tax has a larger indirect eect on an agent if she is connected to agents that also experience
larger direct and indirect eects from it.
8Acemoglu et al. (2012) makes a similar argument in the case of productivity shocks propagating
through the intersectoral network of an economy. See also King et al. (2019) for a discussion on carbon
tax in presence of interdependencies between sectors.
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Indirect eect due to peers' reaction to the tax
. (17)
Figure 1 further illustrates Eq.(17) for the case of three connected agents. Let us
focus on agent a. Firstly, the direct price eect modies consumption of agent a, her
peer - agent b, and the peer of b - agent c. For k = 1, agents a and b experience an
amplication of the direct price eect by imitating consumption of each other. Agent a
further changes her consumption because of her peer's reaction to carbon tax. For k = 2,
the picture is complemented by the role of peers' of peers' (c) reaction to price eect
changing consumption of agent b and, as a consequence, of agent a.
a
b c


















Figure 1: Total eect of carbon tax on agent a when rst and second-order social interactions are
accounted for, i.e. k = 2.
In what follows, we describe how the properties of our model determine the inuence
of social interactions. The social multiplier of a carbon tax is driven by two mechanisms










(see Eq. 8): (i) the endogeneity of tastes to the choices of peers ∂αi∂Hj ; and (ii) the marginal
eect of tastes on consumption choices
∂HBRi
∂αi
. The rst mechanism captures how the
consumption of peers inuences the perception of the goods. Its magnitude aects the
strength of social inuence γ, as stated in Proposition 4. A higher γ can be interpreted
either as a higher visibility of the consumption or a stronger compliance with social
norms.10
Proposition 4. The eect of choices of peers on tastes is increasing in the strength of
social inuence γ.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The second mechanism captures how the change in goods' perception aects the con-
sumption decision. In our model, this depends on the tastes of agents. As shown in
Figure 2, agents with strong taste for either the high- or low-carbon good react less to a
change in taste than agents with neutral tastes.














Figure 2: Partial derivative of the demand function for H with respect to taste for PH(τ) = PL and
σ = 2.
Proposition 5. There is a taste αmax such that the marginal eect of tastes on con-
sumption choices is maximized, i.e.
∂2HBRi
∂α2i




Proof. See Appendix A.
10In the case of solar panel diusion, Baranzini et al. (2017a) show that households are more likely to
adopt the technology if neighbors' panels are more visible.
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Proposition 6. The social multiplier of a tax decreases with the polarization of tastes
if E(α) = αmax.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 5 formalizes that there is a taste αmax that maximizes the social multiplier
of a carbon tax. This taste ensures that agents consume both goods equally at the
optimum before the tax. If an agent consumes mainly one of the two goods before
taxation then she will not respond as strongly to changes in consumption patterns in her
ego-network. Intuitively, agents whose welfare depends primarily on the consumption of
carbon-intensive goods are not as sensitive to social inuence as agents with comparable
consumption of the two goods. As formalized in Proposition 6, in a population with
higher tastes polarization the social multiplier of carbon taxation is lower.
3.2. A Pigouvian tax under socially-embedded preferences
Let vi(PH+τ, wi, e) ≡ U(α?i , H?i , L?i ) denote the indirect utility of agent i. We suppose
that utility is cardinal, thus enabling the comparison of indirect utilities, necessary for
assessing social welfare. We dene the social welfare W as a function of the vector of
indirect utilities. This includes external costs associated with carbon emissions. The
social planning problem is then as follows:
maxτW
(
[vi(PH + τ, wi, e)]i∈N
)
(18)
For a representative agent with xed preferences, the Pigouvian tax is dened by the
traditional F.O.C., H∂v/∂w = ∂e/∂H × ∂H/∂τ , leading to a carbon tax equal to the
marginal damage cost. Under socially embedded-preferences, the Pigouvian tax depends
on the social multiplier, as stated in Proposition 7.




























Proof. See Appendix A
Proposition 7 shows that under socially-embedded preferences, the Pigouvian tax de-
pends on three eects: an income eect − ∂vi∂wiH
?
i , an externality reduction eect taking
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∂τ , and a taste eect ζ. While the rst two
terms are similar to the basic Pigouvian tax rule, the last one arises from the endogeneity
of preferences. As explained above, in addition to modifying the budget constraint, the
tax aects the taste for each good through social interactions, the net eect of which will
determine the reduction in consumption related externalities. The taste for high-carbon
consumption decreases11 so that agents consuming more high- than low-carbon goods





marginal benet when L?i > H
?
i .
To derive more detailed insights about the role of social networks on the optimal tax,
we employ numerical analysis. This is dicult to implement with a Pigouvian approach
as it requires specifying a credible social welfare function, which in turn depends on,
among others, the strong assumption that utility is cardinal. Hence, we proceed with
another, more pragmatic and less contestable approach.
3.3. A target-achieving tax under socially-embedded preferences
An alternative method to set the carbon tax is to determine its lowest value that
suces to meet a particular GHG emissions reduction target (Kunreuther et al., 2013;
van der Ploeg, 2018). This approach is consistent with the Paris Agreement's objective
to limit global warming to 2°C above pre-industrial levels, translated into the intended
nationally determined contributions of all participating countries.
LetQ denote the GHG emission target andQ0 - the initial emission level. The objective
is to nd the lowest tax τ? that achieves the target, i.e. which solves:




H?i (PH(τ)) ≤ Q.





?)) = Q. (21)
The social multiplier Ω reects the eect of the carbon tax on demand that is achieved
through social interactions. A higher (lower) social multiplier means that a lower (higher)
carbon tax can yield the same emissions reduction target. Thus, we compare the eective
tax between the cases with and without social interactions. High-carbon consumption
11Conversely, the taste for low-carbon increases.
14
before tax is a function of the vector of tastes α?,0. If the social planner ignores the
social inuence on preferences, she decides on the level of the tax as if tastes were xed:
αt = α
?,0 ∀t. On the other hand, if the social planner takes into account the dynamics
of preferences, the eective tax will take into account the social multiplier.
Without social interactions, the equilibrium consumption vector dened in Eq.(5) is
the conditional best-response vector in Eq.(4) evaluated at αi = α
?,0
i .










To nd the lowest tax that ensures a sucient reduction of emissions, we integrate the
marginal tax eect. When the integral is equal to the targeted reduction, its upper bound














i , PH(τ), wi)
∂τ
dτ = Q0 −Q. (23)
From Eq.(15) we know that the marginal eect of the tax on high-carbon consumption is
greater with socially-embedded preferences. Therefore, the target-achieving tax is lower
when we take into account the social interactions. This is illustrated in Figure 3. We
dene the tax reduction due to the social multiplier,M , as the relative dierence between
the eective tax with socially-embedded preferences and its counterpart without social
interactions:12




The interpretation of M is the following: accounting for the role of social interactions
allows to reduce the eective tax by M × 100%.
4. Numerical simulations
Now we will perform a numerical analysis to estimate the eects of a target-achieving
tax with imperfect taste imitation. This will allow us to derive the social multiplier
eect, namely by assessing the ratio between similarly eective taxes with and without
social interactions.

























Figure 3: Reduction of high-carbon good consumption due the carbon tax under xed and socially-
embedded preferences.
We estimate a baseline social multiplier for a realistic set of parameters and study the
impact of dierent factors: (i) the strength of social inuence, (ii) the distribution of
tastes, (iii) the topology of the social network and (iv) the income distribution. We set
PH(0) = PL and the target Q = Q0/2. We focus on the case where high- and low-carbon
goods are substitutes (σ = 2).13. We proceed with numerical simulations, following a
four steps procedure:
1. Identify the consumption and taste vectors at the equilibrium (as dened in Eq.5);
2. Assess the minimum tax that yields a decrease of 50% of the carbon-intensive
consumption with respect to the prior equilibrium (as dened by Eq.21);14
3. Determine the minimum tax that yields the same target but xing the tastes at
their equilibrium value prior to the tax (as dened by Eq.22);
13We estimate the social multiplier for complementary goods and show that the qualitative ndings
are not aected by this assumption (see Appendix C)
14To identify the extra eect due to social interactions, we also compute the decrease in carbon-
intensive consumption with the eective tax and no social interactions (γ = 0).
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4. Calculate the tax reduction M due to the social multiplier as dened in Eq.(24).
4.1. Parameter values
Table 1 summarizes the baseline model parametrization and alternatives tested. To
study the interactions between the strength of social inuence and the other factors
mentioned above, we estimate numerically the social multiplier for γ ∈ [0, 1) and for
dierent taste distributions, networks, and income distributions. In the following we
provide more details and motivation for each parameter.
Table 1: Overview of parameters varied in numerical simulations
Baseline Alternatives tested
Strength of social inu-
ence
γ = 0.3 γ ∈ [0, 1)
Distribution of intrinsic
tastes
π ∼ B(1, 1) B(0.1, 0.1), B(4, 4), B(15, 15)
Network topology Small world Regular, random, scale
free
Gini index 0.4 0.2, 0.3, 0.5
4.1.1. Strength of social inuence
The strength of social inuence γ determines how the tastes of agents react to changes
in consumption in their social network. To our knowledge, no empirical study directly
estimates this coecient. To approximate a realistic value, we employ the results of an
experiment undertaken by Falk et al. (2013). In a public good game setting, they estimate
the eect of average contribution of the peers of an agent on her own contribution.
They nd a signicant regression coecient equal to 0.605. For our case, this translates
to ∂Hi, t/∂Si,t = 0.605. Assuming wi = 1, PH = 1, αi = 0.5 and σ = 2, we have
∂αi,t/∂Hi,t = 0.5. Therefore, a rough estimate of the strength of social inuence on
agent's tastes is γ = 0.605× 0.5 u 0.3.
As discussed in Section 2, social interactions can give rise to multiple equilibria. We
nd that the critical value γc depends on the network structure and the intrinsic taste
distribution, and varies between 0.50 and 0.55 (Table 4 in Appendix B). With γ < γc, our
system converges to a unique stable consumption equilibrium. With γ ≥ γc, the system
has two equilibria. In this case, it converges to one of them or oscillates between the
two.15 Clearly, for the baseline value γ = 0.3, we have a unique equilibrium irrespective
of the social network structure and taste distribution.
15In the latter case, we report the average of the two equilibria.
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4.1.2. Intrinsic taste distribution
We assume in the baseline that intrinsic taste for carbon-intensive goods follow a beta
distribution, πi ∼ B(1, 1). This means that the tastes are uniformly distributed in the
interval [0,1]. The variance of this distribution is σ2 = 0.083.
To study the role of polarized tastes, we estimate the social multiplier for three al-
ternative distributions, that are mean-preserving spread transformations of the uniform
distribution. We report the variance of such distributions as a measurement of their
polarization:16
(i) B(15, 15), σ2 = 0.008,
(ii) B(4, 4), σ2 = 0.028,
(iii) B(0.1, 0.1), σ2 = 0.208.





















Figure 4: Distributions of intrinsic tastes.
4.1.3. Topology of the social network
We generate undirected networks17 of 10,000 agents with 20,000 links,18 which results
in a mean degree of 4.19 As we model the emergence of consumption norms, we are
16According to Axiom 3 in Esteban and Ray (1994), symmetric distributions with a higher variance
have a higher polarization.
17A network is undirected if j ∈ Ni ⇔ i ∈ N(j). In other words, i inuencing j implies j inuencing
i.
18The trade-o in deciding on the number of agents is that more agents means that the results are less
dependent on random initial conditions, while the computational time needed increases exponentially.
A network of 10 000 agents is usually considered to ensure sucient robustness with a relatively fast
computational time.
19The degree of an agent is its number of peers in the network. A mean degree of 4 implies a very low
social network density in line with empirical estimates by, e.g., Hu and Wang (2009) and a very sparse
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interested in physical social networks (i.e. a neighborhood, workplace network or friend-
ship network). Many of empirical social networks of these types exhibit two common
characteristics (Amaral et al., 2000; Jin et al., 2001; Handcock et al., 2017): (i) high
clustering, meaning that there is a high probability for two peers of an agent to be con-
nected, and (ii) low average path length, meaning that any two agents are connected
through a low number of links. We achieve these topological properties of a network by
using the well-known small-world algorithm (Watts and Strogatz, 1998).20
To study the inuence of topological characteristics of the social network on the eec-
tive tax, we simulate networks with dierent features (Table 2): (i) regular networks with
high clustering and high average path length, (ii) random networks with low clustering
and low average path length, and (iii) scale free networks with low clustering and av-
erage path length, and asymmetric degree distribution where few so-called 'star agents'
can have a high number of peers, whereas the majority of agents have few connections
(Barabási and Albert, 1999).
Table 2: Network characteristics for 10 000 nodes and 20 000 undirected links
Average Average Degree
clustering path length asymmetry
Regular lattice 50.00 % 1250.00 0.00
Small world 35.62 % 12.50 0.12
Random 0.04 % 6.76 0.50
Scale free 0.15 % 4.27 36.30
Note: Degree asymmetry of a network is measured by the skewness of its degree distribution.
4.1.4. Income distribution
Equation (2) shows that an agent with a higher income and thus signalling a higher
level of consumption has a larger inuence on the consumption norm. Thus, the eect
of peer interaction depends on income. The assumption of a larger social inuence of
agents with a higher income is in line with Veblen (1899), who considers diusion of
conspicuous consumption norms to be instigated by wealthy agents. It is thus relevant
to consider the distribution of income as it translates to weighted social interactions in the
network.21 We set the average income at 36,000 monetary units, the minimum income
social interactions matrix A.
20The small-world algorithm involves generating a network in which agents are connected to a few
nearest neighbors (i.e. a regular lattice), and then rewiring every link with a probability µ. As the
probability goes to 1, the topology resembles a random network. The so-called small world network
topology with high clustering (similar to regular lattice) but low average path length (similar to random
network) is obtained for µ ∈ [0.001, 0.1].
21For more discussion of a social norm diusing through weighted social interactions see Konc and
Savin (2019).
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at 20,000 and the maximum income at 1,000,000. We parametrize a bounded Pareto law
such that we obtain a Gini index approximately equal to 0.4. This is consistent with
empirical values for industrialized countries (Hellebrandt and Mauro, 2016). Income and
degree distributions are slightly correlated22 to take into account the positive relationship
between a high degree and wealth accumulation (Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007). It also
reects that agents nd it attractive to connect with wealthier peers. We estimate the
social multiplier of the carbon tax for alternative income distributions characterized by
Gini indexes equal to 0.2, 0.3 and 0.5.
4.2. Results
As the simulations imply generating random numbers, we report average results over
50 runs for each combination of parameters.23 For the baseline parameter values, we nd
that social interactions multiply the eect of a tax by 1.30, leading to an average tax
reduction M of 0.38. This result means the social multiplier magnies the eect of the
tax such that it can be lowered by 38%. We study the impact of the four above-mentioned
factors on M .
First, we estimate the impact of the strength of social inuence γ on the social mul-
tiplier.24 We nd a non-monotonous eect, namely an inverted U-shape (subplot (A)
in Figure 5). On the one hand, stronger interactions contribute to increase the social
multiplier via the role of consumption norms on tastes. On the other hand, stronger
social inuence leads to a more polarized distribution of tastes in equilibrium before the
tax is implemented, thus undermining the social multiplier (Proposition 6).25 Figure 6
shows the distribution of tastes in equilibrium before and after the tax is introduced. It
illustrates that a higher strength of social inuence is associated with a more polarized
distribution. The highest social multiplier in Figure 5(A) is reached for γ u 0.7. Below
this value, increasing the strength of social interactions has a positive eect on the mul-
tiplier hence lowering the target-achieving tax as the rst mechanism dominates. For
higher values of γ, the resulting polarization of the distribution of tastes weakens the
social multiplier.
22The correlation coecient is equal to 0.1
23For each simulation run, the allocation of income and tastes, and the position of the agents in the
social network are randomized.
24In the following, we use the terms "social multiplier" and "tax reduction" interchangeably, as they
both signal the socially-mediated eect of the tax.
25In other words, without any carbon tax, the initial taste distribution is dierent than the intrinsic
taste distribution to social interactions. Low- and high-carbon consumption norms tend to cluster in
dierent parts of the social network, causing a polarization of tastes. This polarization is due to the
weighted and asymmetric nature of interactions.
20
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
















0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8




















0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8




















0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8




















Figure 5: Reduction in eective carbon tax due to social multiplier eect for varying strength of social
inuence and (A) Baseline parameters; (B) dierent intrinsic taste distributions; (C) dierent network
topologies; (D) dierent income distributions.
Note: Unless specied dierently, the parameters are chosen according to the baseline scenario
specied in Table 1. The shaded area represents +/- 1 standard deviation around the average.
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Figure 6: Taste distributions in equilibrium before and after target-achieving tax for (A) γ = 0.3, (B)
γ = 0.6, (C) γ = 0.9. π ∼ B(1, 1), small-world network and Gini index = 0.4.
Second, we estimate the social multiplier for alternative intrinsic taste distributions.
Figure 5(B) shows the results. We nd that higher polarization of initial tastes leads
to a lower social multiplier. For higher strengths of social inuence the polarization of
tastes in equilibrium does not dier much across the four intrinsic taste distributions,
and hence the social multiplier shows little dierences between these cases.
Third, we estimate the social multiplier for dierent network topologies. We nd that
for γ ≤ 0.45 the exact network topology does not aect the social multiplier. For γ >
0.45, however, considerable dierences arise between distinct network structures (Figure
5C). In particular, we see that a scale-free network tends to produce the lowest social
multiplier. The explanation for this is that taste polarization hence the social multiplier
depends on structural properties of the networks. The emergence of clusters of agents
with either high- or low-carbon tastes undermines the social eects of the carbon tax.
In the scale-free network, agents with many peers and higher income serve as inuence
hubs contributing to the strongest polarization of tastes (Figure 7D). In the regular and
small-world networks agents are embedded in clusters of strongly interconnected peers
reinforcing each others' tastes, resulting in strong taste polarization (Figure 7A-B). Given
the lower clustering value of the small-world network compared to the regular one (Table
2), there is a lower resistance of agents to change to low-carbon consumption resulting in
higher social multiplier. Finally, the random network has little degree asymmetry and the
lowest clustering which translates into the highest social multiplier and tax reduction for
γ ∈ [0.6, 0.7]. Its performance quickly deteriorates though for γ → 1 as even a moderate
degree asymmetry becomes sucient to produce taste polarization. To summarize, while
short paths connecting distinct parts of a clustered social network increase the social
multiplier, degree asymmetry particularly under high social inuence reduces it. In
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other words, social network structures where people are exposed to a greater variety of
opinions without strong opinion leaders are most benecial in magnifying the eectiveness
of a carbon tax.






















































Figure 7: Taste distributions in equilibrium before and after target-achieving tax (γ = 0.7) for (A)
regular network, (B) small world network, (C) random network, (D) scale free network.
Finally, we compute the social multiplier for income distributions with dierent Gini
indices (Figure 5(D)). We nd that income inequality does not inuence the social mul-
tiplier for γ ≤ 0.5. However, for higher γ, a lower income inequality leads to a higher
socially mediated eect. This is because income inequality results in asymmetric inter-
actions, where wealthier agents have a stronger eect on stationary consumption norm.
This asymmetry dampens the social multiplier. Table 3 summarizes the results of our
numerical experiments.
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Table 3: Drivers of the social multiplier
Driver Eect
Strength of social inuence Non-monotonic
Polarization of intrinsic taste Negative
Degree asymmetry of the social network Negative
Income inequality Negative
5. Conclusions
Given substantial evidence that preferences of agents depend on social context, we
extend environmental policy analysis with social interactions among consumers. In par-
ticular, empirical evidence shows that the consumption of many types of goods and
services that generate considerable environmental externalities in production is subject
to social inuence. This underpins the relevance of analyzing of what we have called the
"social multiplier of environmental policy". We applied our framework to carbon pricing
analysis and developed a model of carbon-intensive consumption with socially-embedded
agents. Their utility is a function of consumption of high- and low-carbon goods, intrin-
sic preferences for high-carbon goods, and consumption decisions of peers in their social
network.
In this setting, consumption decisions are aected directly by the price eect and indi-
rectly by consumption decisions of peers. We demonstrate that if agents are inuenced
by the observed consumption of peers without inferring their tastes, i.e. showing imper-
fect imitation, then interdependent preferences gives rise to a positive social multiplier of
carbon taxation, which amplies policy eectiveness. We further nd that if agents try to
perfectly imitate the tastes of their peers, social interactions either amplify or undermine
the tax eectiveness, depending on the substitutability between low- and high-carbon
goods. In particular, we show that if goods are substitutes the tax multiplier is negative
if agents correctly anticipate the reaction of their peers to the tax and positive if they
fail to do so.
Focusing on the rst and arguably more realistic case, we estimated the impact of
social interactions on a target-achieving tax through social network simulations. For
realistic parameter values we nd that social interactions create a social multiplier of 1.30,
which reduces the eective tax rate by 38%. Numerical analysis shows that the socially-
embedded eects of a tax depend on (i) the strength of social inuence, (ii) intrinsic
preference polarization, (iii) clustered or asymmetric social networks, and (iv) income
inequality. In particular, the topology of the social network and the income distribution
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do not aect the social multiplier for a moderate strength of social inuence. However,
for a high social inuence, the social multiplier decreases with income inequality and
degree asymmetry of the social network. We further demonstrate that high polarization
of preferences undermines the social multiplier of carbon pricing.
The fact that the eect of price variation on consumption decisions is not instantaneous
but mediated by social interactions can help to explain dierences between observed
impacts of carbon taxation and fuel price uctuations. Empirical studies indicate that
the tax elasticity of fuel consumption is up to three times higher than the price elasticity
(Li et al., 2014; Rivers and Schaufele, 2015; Andersson, 2019). This phenomenon is
generally explained by salience of taxes or crowding-in of intrinsic preferences. Our study
suggests another explanation, namely that taxes may have a stronger eect because they
cause a long-term price change, in turn allowing consumer preferences to adjust through
social interactions. In other words, the tax eect is stronger because it involves the eect
of social inuence on top of the direct price eect.
Our study has not only implications for the design of a rst-best Pigouvian tax. The so-
cial planner may consider additional, complementary instruments that employ or modify
the social network so as to make the environmental policy more eective. In line with the
four factors mediating the strength of the social multiplier of taxation in our framework,
illustrative instruments are:
1. Comparative feedbacks to reinforce the social context in the formation of prefer-
ences (Allcott, 2011; Astier, 2018). In the context of our model, this would translate
into a higher social-inuence parameter γ.
2. Information policies to correct misperceptions of climate change, which would al-
ter the preference structure towards low-carbon consumption goods (Moxnes and
Saysel, 2009). Alternatively, such policies could expose people to distinct opinions,
and highlight the behavioral feasibility of alternative lifestyles.
3. Targeted subsidies or marketing policies to encourage the most interconnected
agents in a social network (inuence hubs) to adopt low-carbon options (Neilson
and Wichmann, 2014; Bloch et al., 2016).
4. Revenue recycling schemes associated with the carbon tax to reduce income inequal-
ity, such as lump-sum redistribution or more ambitious re-distributive schemes.
By increasing the social multiplier, such additional policy instruments allow for a further
reduction in the eective environmental tax. This in turn will improve the political
feasibility of carbon taxation as an instrument of climate policy.
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Proof. The optimal consumption of one agent is dened implicitly as a function of all
other agent's consumption. Therefore, we cannot simply dierentiate the demand func-
tion in Eq. (4) to derive the demand-response to a tax. Instead, we dene a function of
consumption and tax F that evaluates to 0 at the optimum consumption level, and use
the implicit function theorem. Let this function be:
Fi(H,PH(τ), wi) = Hi −HBRi (α, PH(τ), w) ∀i ∈ N. (25)
Here H is the vector of consumption of agents and HBR(.) was dened in Eq.(4) as the
optimal consumption (best response) given consumption choices in the network. From
Eq.(7) in equilibrium we have:
Fi(H
?, PH(τ), wi) = H
?
i −HBRi (α?j , PH(τ), wi) = 0 ∀i ∈ N. (26)
To nd the change in H? after a carbon tax, we apply the implicit function theorem

















The second term on the RHS of Eq. (27) is the augmented price eect for all agents,
i.e. the change in demand as if tastes were xed to their equilibrium value before the tax































































The inuence of agent j on agent i occurs through change in taste only. Using the chain








∀i, j ∈ N2. (30)
The carbon tax indirectly alters preferences through social interactions taking place be-
tween agents. By assumption, an increase in the consumption of the high-carbon good
by agent j ∈ Ni increases the taste for the same good of agent i :
∂αi(.)
∂Hj
> 0 ∀i, j ∈ N ×Ni. (31)
with Ti ≡
∑
j∈Ni(1 − PH(τ))Hj + wj denoting the total consumption in agent's i ego-
network, and H̃i ≡
∑
j∈Ni Hj the consumption of high-carbon goods in agent i ego-






















k = I + ∞∑
k=1












































A is an N by N matrix of social interactions whose ij element is the marginal change in
the consumption of the high-carbon good of agent i induced by a change in high-carbon
consumption of her social peer j. Note that this element is strictly positive if i and j
are connected in the network (Eq. 31) and 0 otherwise. A raised to the power k > 1
represents the indirect social interactions between agents connected through k links. For
instance, the elements of A2 represent indirect interactions of agents with one common
peer. We call the matrix Ω the social multiplier of carbon taxation. As all entries of A
are positive and at least one is strictly positive, it follows that all entries of Ω are positive
31
and the diagonal entries are greater than 1.26












































































which is dened in Eq. (29). Substituting












































< 0 ∀i ∈ N. (37)
A.2 Proposition 2
Proof. The social component of preferences SP is
SPi (xi, PH) ≡ D−1(xi, PH). (38)
26Theorem 8.3.1 in Jackson (2010) states that the power iteration
∑∞
k=1Ak converges if and only if
every set of nodes that is strongly connected and closed is aperiodic. Note that the power iteration will
converge if there is a single stable equilibrium, i.e. if γ < γc (Horst and Scheinkman, 2006).
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Let ᾱi ≡ SPi (xi, PH) denote the inferred taste for a given observed consumption in agent's
i ego-network. As SR is the inverse function of D, we have:
SPi (D(ᾱi,
∑














Eq. 40 shows that if the inferred taste ᾱi is the actual taste of all peers of agent i,
then she is able to perfectly attribute all changes in observed consumption to the change
in relative prices. Hence, her inference of peer's tastes and own socially-embedded taste
will not change.
Comparison of (39) and (40) shows that the eect of a price change on taste depends on
the gap between the real consumption change of peers ∂xi∂PH and the expected consumption


















j∈Ni Dj(αj , PH), PH))
∂PH
(41)
By Proposition 1, the above implies that the tax eect is higher under socially-
embedded preferences.
A.3 Corollary 1
Proof. Underestimating the change of the share of H in the total consumption is equiv-
alent to underestimating the average change in H. To simplify the notation, we dene





















j∈Ni Dj(αj , PH), PH))
∂PH
⇔ G̃i < G(H−1(H̃i))
⇔ G−1(G̃i) < H−1(H̃i), (42)
because G and G−1 are increasing functions.
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We now show that Eq. (42) is true if the utility function has certain properties. To
simplify the proof, we study the case with Ni = {1, 2} but the result can be generalized.
Let α1 and α2 denote the tastes of agent i's peers, with 0 ≤ α1 < α2 ≤ 1. We dene
ᾱ ≡ H−1(H̃i) as the inferred average taste, therefore H(α2) − H(ᾱ) = H(ᾱ) − H(α1).























If G(α2)−G(ᾱ)G(ᾱ)−G(α1) is lower than one, then the average of G(a) and G(b) is reached for an










































αi(σ − 2)− σ(1− αi)σPH(τ)σ−1
, (47)









[αi(σ − 2)PH(τ)− σ(1− αi)σPH(τ)σ]2
> 0 (48)
⇔ σ < 1. (49)
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A.4 Proposition 3




















∀i ∈ N (51)
A.5 Proposition 4





= γ ∂Si∂Hj . In other words,
the sensitivity of preferences to the choices of peers increases with the strength of social
interactions.
A.6 Proposition 5









The condition for Eq. 52 being equal to 0 is:
f ′(αi)g(αi)− f(αi)g′(αi) = 0
Substituting f(αi) = σwiPH(τ)
2σ−1(1− αi)σ−1ασi




















ασ−1i − (1− αi)
σ−1PH(τ)
σ−1) (ασi + PH(τ)σ−1(1− αi)σ)
we obtain:






i − (1− αi)σ−1PH(τ)σ−1)







is a solution to Eq. 53.
A.7 Proposition 6
Proof. From the axioms 2 and 3 in Esteban and Ray (1994), any symmetric shift of
tastes from the central αmax to the lateral tastes (i.e. towards either 0 or 1) increases
polarization. From Proposition 5, it follows that a lower density of agents with the taste
αmax translates into a lower social multiplier.
A.8 Proposition 7
Proof. The social planning problem is maxτW
(



































 = 0. (54)

















































































 = 0 (55)
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Appendix B Critical value γc
Table 4 shows the values γc such that if γ < γc then the system of social interactions
has a single equilibrium. We derived those values numerically, for dierent network
structures and intrinsic preference distributions.
Table 4: Critical value γc for dierent network structures and intrinsic preference distributions
B(0.1,0.1) B(1,1) B(4,4) B(15,15)
Regular lattice 0.52 0.52 0.54 0.54
Small world 0.51 0.52 0.52 0.55
Random 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.51
Scale free 0.51 0.52 0.54 0.54
Appendix C Social multiplier for complementary goods, σ = 0.5
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8















Figure 8: Reduction in eective carbon tax due to social multiplier eect for the baseline scenario
specied in Table 1. The shaded area represents +/- 1 standard deviation around the average.
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